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A B S T R A C T
Access to Information regimes are under unremitting challenge from state actors. This article is the first to
directly explore the ‘cost limit’ often included in Access to Information regimes, where requests can be refused by
a Public Authority on the basis of an estimate that it would take too long to locate and extract the requested
information. The validity of such estimates is particularly important in light of electronic information systems
where search times are dependant upon technological expertise. This article presents a qualitative study of
decisions made by the United Kingdom's Information Commissioner, where decision notices concerning the ‘cost
limit’ are examined to identify technological errors. These technological errors were found to arise from specific
practices of the Commissioner in 40% of cases where an estimate of the Public Authority was accepted. The
author demonstrates that the concept of estimating the time taken to find information from an electronic in-
formation system is an objectively inappropriate means for estimating the burden placed on a Public Authority.
Through the use of mathematics, it is demonstrated an estimation regime based on the volume of information
requested is more appropriate as an alternative. From a wider regulatory perspective, this article also demon-
strates that it would be highly desirable for Access to Information regimes to be regulated alongside data pro-
tection concerns, given the strong overlap in respect of the relevant technological issues.
1. Introduction
According to Lawrence Tribe, the use of Mathematics in the legal
process might be “more dangerous than fruitful” (Tribe, 1971). Math-
ematical models present the prospect of distorting the trial process, by
modelling issues that are inappropriate for a particular legal scenario
and the underlying values that the law is intended to reflect (Meyerson
& Meyerson, 2009). This risk has been borne out in a wide range of
settings, be it the probability of non-accidental cot death (Hill, 2005),
the misuse of mathematics to reduce compensation payments to people
based upon their gender or ethnicity (Meyerson & Meyerson, 2009), or
the abuse of arbitrary multipliers to reach a given probability in a
criminal trial (Hamer, 2012). As the eminent jurist and economics
scholar Richard Posner explained in Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786
(7th Cir. 2013), this is a simple matter of persistent errors arising from a
“widespread, and increasingly troublesome, discomfort among lawyers
and judges confronted by a scientific or other technological issues”.
This article presents a qualitative analysis of the decisions made by
the United Kingdom's Information Commissioner under s.12(1) of the
Freedom of Information Act (2000) (hereon the “FOIA (2000)”).
Colloquially, this provision is known as the cost limit, which is a feature
that is common in various forms (including in some cases as a fee
charged to a requester) across Access to Information Regimes inter-
nationally. Where a Public Authority estimates in advance that it would
cost more than the appropriate limit (typically 18 hours work for an
official), they are entitled to refuse to provide the information in
question. Compared to the filing cabinet of yesteryear operated using a
fixed filing index, the computation of estimates of search time in
modern information systems is more challenging, because they can be
dynamically indexed on the basis of their contents using electronic
search methods. This means that there is a far greater scope for tech-
nological or mathematical misunderstandings to undergird estimates of
information retrieval costs. The simple fact is that modern data systems
store vastly increased amounts of information compared to their paper
ancestors, especially with the increasing emphasis on big data
(Grimmelmann, 2013; Kim, Trimi, & Chung, 2014). If estimation
methods for measuring the burden posed by an information request do
not keep pace, then the inevitable result would be a severe reduction in
the amount of information that can be obtained by an individual re-
quester in the context of an Access to Information regime. Together
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with the low success rate for a complaint under s.12(1) (where 7.2%
succeed before the Commissioner, compared to 24.8% more gen-
erally1), it is worth asking if these decisions arise from a misuse of
mathematics.
The extent of the resources made available to enable public policy
initiatives is well established to be an important factor in their success
when they are put into practice (de Julnes & Holzer, 2001). Given the
emphasis upon record retrieval and processing, it is unsurprising that
this concern has been particularly important for Access to Information
regimes (Camaj, 2016; Neuman & Calland, 2007). Entwined with this is
also a question of organisational practice, with a study of the United
Kingdom's Access to Information regime identifying disorganisation
and administrative difficulties in how this is implemented on the
ground (Shepherd, Stevenson, & Flinn, 2010). It has been widely re-
cognised that there are often strong incentives on the ground for poli-
ticians and Public Authorities alike to resist providing responses to in-
formation requests (Hazell, 1989; Roberts, 2005) meaning that
inaccurate considerations of resources could tempt these authorities to
refuse requests that they ought not to. The purported cost of fulfilling
information requests by Public Authorities has been stridently raised by
a range of organisations seeking to dilute the strength of FOI laws
themselves, the most notable recent example being in the United
Kingdom (Burns, Carlile, Hodgson, Howard, & Straw, 2015). Given the
paradigm of “survival by dilution” (Worthy, 2017) that afflicts most
Access to Information regimes, the risk of inertia when considering cost
regimes is a serious issue that ought to be considered carefully going
forwards.
This background means that the perceived or claimed difficulties
in searching for documents could have significant consequences for
any Access to Information regime, especially if the true cost or re-
source implications are exaggerated or inflated. In turn, this raises
some questions: Do asserted resourcing problems arise out of tech-
nological and mathematical misunderstandings, rather than genuine
burdens arising from fulfilling information requests? Could a Public
Authority use obscure approaches towards estimation to frustrate
Access to Information requests? And are numerical estimates are an
unjust approach towards assessing burden in the context of elec-
tronic information systems? The latter question should be considered
against the fact that Access to Information is often seen to be a
Human Rights Issue (per the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary (Application no.
18030/11), as well having a wider effect of supporting democracy, in
addition to its recognition as a potential tool for good governance, by
improving transparency (Kreimer, 2007), and uncovering institu-
tional corruption (Cordis & Warren, 2014; Vadlamannati & Cooray,
2017).
Regrettably, this article demonstrates that the answers to all those
questions is often yes. The analysis of the Information Commissioner's
decisions presented herein demonstrates that many Public Authorities
regularly use electronic tools in an inadequate and ineffectual manner,
often constraining their search processes to a particular graphical user
interface. Furthermore, even where appropriate tools are used, the es-
timated time to use them is sometimes exaggerated, based on assertions
on search time that are mathematically flawed. This means that a priori
estimates of ‘search time’ pertaining to an electronic information
system are an inappropriate means for restricting the burden of re-
quests, due to the arbitrariness of such estimates. After establishing
these concerns, this article then turns to the public policy implications
and proposes replacing search time with an estimate of the volume of
information that is being requested, demonstrating the efficacy of this
approach with the use of mathematics.
2. Legal background
The decisions made by the Information Commissioner have a legal
context. They are made pursuant to the specific duties articulated in
s.50 of the FOIA (2000) and amount to adjudications on whether that
Act in entirety was complied with. This means that the qualitative
analysis within this work sits within a specific legal context. There are
three specific issues that need to be addressed in some detail. First,
there is the “cost limit” under s.12 of the Act. Second, given this paper
concerns electronic search, the recent case law on what is said to be a
reasonable search strategy for eDisclosure is reviewed, because there is
no case law that expressly concerns s.12 itself. Finally, the duties of the
Commissioner in respect of making a decision notice are considered, as
this work performs qualitative analysis with respect to them.
This account is limited to those aspects of the FOIA (2000) regime in
the United Kingdom that are central to this article. For a wider picture,
the reader should study Philip Coppel's authoritative text on the specific
legal provisions (Coppel, 2014), whilst a more accessible background
can be found in the work of Birkinshaw (Birkinshaw, 2010). For the
purposes of clarity, the core terminology used in this article is sum-
marised in Table 1, including the respective roles of each actor. This
background states the law as it was on the 1st of December 2017.
2.1. The ‘cost limit’ under the Freedom of Information Act (2000)
Under the FOIA (2000) an organisation listed as a Public Authority
in Schedule 1 must comply with a request for information that is in
conformity with Part I of that Act. This includes s.12, which is known
colloquially as the ‘cost limit’. Pursuant to s.12(1), a Public Authority is
not obliged to comply with a “request for information” if it reasonably
estimates the cost of doing so would exceed the “appropriate limit”. If
the cost of merely confirming that the Public Authority holds the in-
formation would (in its reasonable estimation) exceed the “appropriate
limit”, then s.12(2) provides that the Public Authority need not provide
such confirmation. In respect of the Public Authority, s.13 clearly in-
dicates that they may at their discretion exceed the “appropriate limit”
and if they choose to do so, charge for the provision of the requested
information, if they provide appropriate notice to the information re-
quester.
The “appropriate limit” is itself set by regulations issued by the
Minister for the Cabinet Office. Presently, these are the Freedom of
Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations
2004. In financial terms, the “appropriate limit” is set at £450 for most
Public Authorities and £600 for those listed in Part I of Schedule I of the
FOIA (2000). The Public Authorities in the latter case are generally
those associated with central government. The concept of a financial
cost is largely a notional one in this setting, because the time of a
human operator is automatically counted as being £25 an hour, no
matter who is fulfilling the request. In most cases then, the limit is ef-
fectively temporal, rather than financial. Furthermore, the Public
Authority may only count the following activities under s.12 for its
estimate: “(a) determining whether it holds the information, (b) lo-
cating the information, or a document which may contain the in-
formation, (c) retrieving the information, or a document which may
contain the information, and (d) extracting the information from a
document containing it.”
These calculations are to be performed in respect of the most rapid
search strategy available to the Public Authority using their existing
information systems, with s.12 only applying if the Public Authorities
estimate is “reasonable”, in the sense of being “sensible, realistic and
supported by cogent evidence”, per the case of APG v Information
Commissioner & The Ministry of Defence [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC). In the
case of Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v (1) The Information
Commissioner (2) Donnie Mackenzie [2014] UKUT 479 (AAC), it was
further decided that the FOIA (2000) is not “a statute that prescribes
any particular organisational structure or record-keeping practice in
1 These are based upon the Information Commissioner's own statistics (in
particular the 2015/16 dataset), which can be found here: https://ico.org.uk/
about-the-ico/our-information/complaints-and-concerns-data-sets/.
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Public Authorities”: in other words, if an existing record system is
poorly designed2 and there is no way to overcome that limitation, then
the temporal implications arising from these technological or practical
limitations count towards the appropriate limit under s.12.
Notably, as confirmed in The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
v The Information Commissioner [2011] EWHC 44 (Admin), the time
taken for ‘redacting’ documents is not included under s.12. It should be
evident to the reader that redacting documents can often take far longer
than locating them in the first place. The reader might ask: what hap-
pens then? Fortunately, s.14 protects against ‘vexatious’ requests. If the
overall burden of the request is manifestly unreasonable, then the
Public Authority can refuse to comply on that basis. As made clear in
Information Commissioner and Devon County Council v Alan Dransfield
(GIA/3037/2011), this would be a factor in a proportionality test
(which would include other factors such as the value of the information,
the pattern of requests and the motive of the requester). It is possible for
a perfectly benign request with a strong emphasis on the public interest
to be rejected under s.14 in cases where the expense itself is estimated
to be extravagant (see McInerney v Information Commissioner and the
Department of Education [2015] UKUT 47 (AAC) for an example of this).
However, it must be remembered that vexatiousness, although an im-
portant safety valve, is still a high hurdle for a Public Authority to
overcome and is unlikely to apply in most cases.
2.2. Information search in litigation (eDisclosure)
There has been no binding case law which considers the specific
features of Electronic Information Systems in respect of s.12 estimations
under the FOIA (2000). Fortunately, the issues presented by electronic
information systems are not exclusive to FOIA (2000) requests.
Litigation generally requires appropriate disclosure of documents be-
tween parties, which when applied to Electronic Information Systems,
is known as ‘eDisclosure’. In practice, the vast volume of documentation
that is potentially relevant in some cases requires keyword searches or
‘predictive coding’ (in reality, this is machine learning) to be used to
narrow down the pool of documentation. This has created a recent
jurisprudence on whether given automated search strategies or tech-
nologies are appropriate. Central to that jurisprudence is the acceptance
that concepts of Precision and Recall – which can be used to describe
the performance of any decision rule – are appropriate measures for
determining whether a given approach should be chosen (see Brown v
BCA Trading Ltd & Ors [2016] EWHC 1464 (Ch) and Pyrrho Investments
Ltd v MWB Property Ltd & Ors [2016] EWHC 256 (Ch)).3 There is no
reason why these measures cannot be in principle be applied to FOIA
(2000) requests, where particular search strategies are to be considered,
which is a matter considered later in this article.
2.3. Decision notices issued by the United Kingdom Information
Commissioner
The Information Commissioner is the ombudsman that addresses
complaints that a Public Authority has not complied with the FOIA
(2000). This work considers a particular type of document called a
Decision Notice, which has a legal context arising from Section 50 of
Table 1
A summary of the terminology used within this work. This includes widely used abbreviations, where appropriate.
Term (and abbreviation) Summary
Freedom of Information Act (2000) (“the FOIA (2000)”) The main piece of legislation governing Access to Information in the United Kingdom.
Appropriate Limit (the “cost limit” or “s.12 FOIA (2000)”) This is a term found in s.12 of the FOIA (2000). It refers to a limit on how long a Public Authority is
expected to search for in order to find the information requested in a FOIA request. The limit itself is
set by regulations.
Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and
Fees) Regulations 2004 (“the Regulations”).
These regulations are a piece of secondary legislation whose responsibility for drafting is held by the
Minister for the Cabinet Office. They describe how estimates of time should be computed for the
purposes of the ‘cost limit’ in s.12 of the FOIA (2000), as well as setting down the ‘appropriate limit’.
Freedom of Information Act (2000) request (“FOIA request” or
“information request”).
A written request for recorded information delivered to a Public Authority.
Requester The person or organisation who wrote to a Public Authority making a request for recorded
information.
Public Authority The organisation receiving a request and who is listed as being subject to the provisions of the FOIA
2000 in Schedule 1 of said Act.
Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) The regulator for Information Rights in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. They hear first instance
complaints in respect of Public Authorities who a complainant asserts erroneously dealt with a request
under the FOIA (2000).
First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (“the FTT”) This Tribunal hears appeals from the Information Commissioner and has the same powers to address a
complaint that a Public Authority failed to deal with a request in accordance with the requirements of
the FOIA (2000)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber (“the UT(AAC)”) Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal can be made to the Upper Tribunal, but only on the basis that
there was an ‘error of law’. Unlike the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal is a superior court of
record with equivalent status to the High Court, meaning that its decisions are binding on the First-tier
Tribunal and the Commissioner.
Decision Notice A document produced by the Information Commissioner in response to a Complaint by a requester
that a Public Authority did not deal with a Freedom of Information request under the FOIA (2000).
eDisclosure The process of identifying documents for litigation contained in an electronic system for potential
disclosure to the parties of a legal case.
Graphical User Interface (“GUI”) A user interface where, in contrast to the traditional ‘command line’, users can interact with a range of
graphical and visual components (e.g. clicking on icon's with a mouse to start specific programs or
functions), as opposed purely entering typed commands.
Predictive Coding The use of machine learning to determine if documents are relevant, typically in a legal setting. This
process works by the use of labelled training sample, from which the ‘system’ learns a rule for
categorising the remaining (unlabelled) documents.
2 Since this analysis was performed, there has been a further decision (Cruelty
Free International v Information Commissioner [2017] UKUT 318 (AAC)) from the
Upper Tribunal, which extended Judge Wikeley's decision to also include un-
lawful information systems.
3 These arguments have also been accepted internationally, e.g. in the
Republic of Ireland (per Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd & ors -v- Quinn &
ors [2015] IEHC 175) and the United States in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe,
No. 11 Civ.1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 2012).
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the FOIA (2000). A Decision Notice is a official response that the
Information Commissioner provides in respect of a complaint submitted
to them that relates to s.50(1), namely a “decision whether, in any
specified respect, a request for information made by the complainant to
a Public Authority has been dealt with in accordance with” the re-
quirements of the FOIA (2000). The Commissioner (and an appellate
Tribunal) has the jurisdiction to issue a Decision Notice even if it de-
cides that, for instance, no such request was made (e.g. if the complaint
was not made to a Public Authority under the Act): see Fish Legal v
Information Commissioner & Ors [2015] UKUT 52 (AAC) at 55. A
Decision Notice must be issued where the Commissioner does not use
their powers under s.50(2) to reject a case without giving a decision:
s.50(2) only applies where the Commissioner finds that either (i) the
Complainant should have used a complaints process of the Public
Authority in question, (ii) there was an undue delay in making the
complaint to the Commissioner, (iii) the complaint (not the request) is
frivolous or vexatious or (iv) the complaint to the Commissioner has
been withdrawn or abandoned. In practice, then, this means that a
diverse range of cases – almost no matter the competence of the com-
plainant – will have been investigated and adjudicated upon by the
Commissioner. This means that there is a broad corpus available for the
analysis presented in this work.
There are a few remarks that should be made about the format of a
decision notice. In Sugar v British Broadcasting Corp & Anor [2009] UKHL
9 (a case before the House of Lords which was then the highest court in
the land) it was decided that the Commissioner need only provide a
“letter setting out [their] decision” (para 37). For a document not to be
an appealable decision notice, it would have to be “so completely in-
coherent or unconnected to his legal powers that it was not in law a
notice at all”, which Judge Jacobs pointed out might be “easier to
imagine than to find in the real world” (see the Information
Commissioner v Gordon Bell [2014] UKUT 0106 (AAC)). However, as
Coppel observes, although the express obligations are loose, “in practice
the Commissioner always gives reasons, sometimes quite substantial
ones” and that “the better view is probably that the Commissioner is
under a duty to provide such reasons as he can” (Coppel, 2014). There
are good reasons for the Commissioner to issue a properly reasoned
decision: a dissatisfied party (be it the complainant or the Public Au-
thority) has the right to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (General
Regulatory Chamber), which can replace the decision of the Commis-
sioner (and from there, appeal is to the Upper Tribunal Administrative
Appeals Chamber in most cases). As well as producing a critique of the
Commissioner's decision making, the First-tier Tribunal (under Rule 10)
has the power to award costs against the Commissioner if the Decision
Notice issued was “unreasonable”. Accordingly, whilst there is not an
express legal requirement for a decision notice to be properly reasoned
and argued, in practice there are strong incentives for the Commis-
sioner to do so and in turn, such an approach is the usual practice of the
Commissioner.
3. Methodology
This work is based upon document analysis, which has been a
method used for understanding legal decision making, including by
ombudsman and tribunals (Farrar, Donnelly, & Dhaliwal, 2013; Gilad,
2009; Hunter & Tyson, 2017) and more specifically, for exploring
practices surrounding Freedom of Information (Camaj, 2016; Cherry &
McMenemy, 2013). In the context of the Information Commissioner,
where there is a practice of producing detailed reasons in respect of a
Decision Notice, and a significant volume of cases, it is possible to
obtain a detailed understanding of the patterns behind decision making.
To extract a sample for analysis, the author downloaded all Decision
Notices that were available on the Information Commissioner's website
dated between the 1st of April 2016 and the 31st of March 2017 (as
published on the 6th of April 2017) and which were labelled as having
considered s.12 of the FOIA (2000). After an initial pass, the original 92
decisions were reduced to 80, with five decisions being removed be-
cause the case concerned s12(2) (i.e. the cost of confirming if in-
formation is held at all) rather than s.12(1), another four were removed
because of an assertion that the published analysis on s.12(1) was not
complete (e.g. for security reasons) and three were removed as dupli-
cates or being wrongly labelled. Of those that remained, the complaint
against the Public Authority was upheld in 5 cases, meaning that of this
sample, only 6.25% (5 out of 80) were upheld and in 93.75% of cases,
the Public Authority's estimate under s.12 was accepted by the In-
formation Commissioner.
The aim of this work is to understand practices in the Information
Commissioner's Office (and in Public Authorities whose decisions are
appealed) in respect of determinations concerning s.12 of the FOIA
(2000). Practices imply a degree of repetition. This work is therefore
focussed on identifying repeated problems and errors which are mani-
fested as explicit practices, rather than the occasional mistakes which
are part and parcel of any regulatory operation (and presumably apply
to complaints to the Commissioner across their subject matter, in-
cluding cases that have nothing to do with s.12 of the FOIA (2000)). As
such, each decision notice was read first to identify potential techno-
logical errors within the scope of s.12: this means that if the
Commissioner identified that an old record system (e.g. manual filing
cabinets) were still being used and that system could not be searched
efficiently, then no error was recorded (per the decision in MacKenzie
described in the legal background). In the event, 54 out of 80 Decision
Notices were flagged as having potential concerns. Where potential
errors were identified, the decision notice was re-read carefully to de-
termine if the error was likely to have taken place: the aim was identify
clear errors that could have changed the outcome of a case, rather than
slips or minor mistakes. In effect then, these were issues which would
be fatal to the estimate under s.12 being sufficiently supported by
‘cogent evidence’ and thus making it a guess. For these purposes, a clear
error was where the Commissioner had accepted a practice or plain
assertion of a Public Authority which may have had a substantive im-
pact upon an estimate and reflected a substantial technological or
mathematical misunderstanding: often these amounted to questions
that the Commissioner ought to have asked, but according to their
notice, did not.
These errors were then thematically analysed into categories, where
the same type of error was repeated at least five times to ensure that
this was indeed a practice of the Commissioner. The result was three
higher level themes: (i) unconvincing cases of Graphical User Interface
barriers, (ii) cases where an organisation would perform a cursory
keyword search as a form of estimation and (iii) assertions that all
documents would need to be read beginning to end in order to de-
termine if they were relevant to the request. The first theme was di-
vided into subthemes, (i) the assertion that it was impossible to perform
any form of automated search (e.g. using keywords), (ii) assertions that
it was impossible to perform specific types of searches and (iii) an as-
sertion that ‘Chinese Walls’ exist and that the information system
cannot be searched as a cohesive whole. The occurrence of these themes
are summarised in Table 2: notably, 40% of cases where the complaint
was not upheld had a clear error identified. In what follows, each theme
is documented in turn (in Section 4), before the technological diffi-
culties being then explained more specifically (in Section 5).
4. The Information Commissioner's practices
4.1. Graphical user interface limits or prohibits electronic search
There were numerous cases where a Public Authority asserted that it
was not possible to conduct keyword searches of an electronic system, or in
the alternative, that the search mechanism was heavily constrained as to
significantly impede efficient electronic search (e.g. it was only possible to
search ‘title’ fields in a database). These assertions generally revolved
around the presumption that only a given graphical user interface could be
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used in order to manipulate the data, instead of these systems being cap-
able of queried in a programmatic fashion using SQL or other database
commands. There were three particular variants of this concern identified
within this analysis, which are now detailed in turn.
4.1.1. Impossible to search electronically at all
The first example is where no automatic searches could be performed at
all, which was typically accepted without any substantive questioning by
the Information Commissioner. Often, this was a simple assertion that was
unsupported by any clear evidence. One example concerned the Financial
Ombudsman Service (FS50611202), where it was said that the “only way it
could identify disabled consumers would be to look into the complainant's file for
each relevant query or referral, to see if a disability or otherwise has been noted in
either the consumer complaint form or any other correspondence it has received”.
But even though there might not be an express category, it seems unusual
that they could not search their system automatically to find someone with
a disability using appropriate keywords, especially given that this corre-
spondence was often contained in emails. In effect, then, this is an implied
assertion of an inability to perform keyword searches.
In other cases, the Public Authority was more direct. With the case of
FS50595166, the Public Authority made reference to a particular electronic
archiving system which was said to be a secure ‘non-compatible’ system,
where it was said that “the archive is isolated on a secure non compatible system
and searches would be from a remote server (which means connection speeds are
slow)” and also could not be directly searched (the request was in effect for
email metadata). In another case (FS50610254), it was asserted that the
documents were scanned in from paper originals and it was therefore im-
possible to search them. However, if the documents were to be laser printed
text, rather than handwritten, then this simply would not be true, because
these can be searched using keywords, after Optical Character Recognition
(OCR) software is applied to the documents in question. A further case
concerned a request for results allocated by location or postcode district
(FS50623258), where the Commissioner accepted an unevidenced assertion
that this would have to be done manually (because this could only be done,
said the council, by manually reading free-text records in their databases).
This overlooks that it is possible to use a ‘look up’ table to address this issue
and thus automatically remap the data into a format that can be easily
searched to fulfil the information request. These are all cases where it is
likely that the Public Authority in question was unaware of how to effi-
ciently use its own systems.
One particularly concerning example of this was the University of
the Arts London, in FS50629817. The requester wanted to know the
particular grades of people who applied for a given course. There was
said to be over 800 applicants. It was argued by the University that it
“does not have an operational requirement to hold the data in Get [their
database system] the way that would enable a report to be produced easily in
order to respond and provide the information sought by the complainant”.
They then went on to provide a detailed process of how a GUI would
need to be navigated by the member of staff, to manually extract all of
the records in turn, taking 10minutes per record.4 The Commissioner
accepted this argument without question, noting that:
“As described at paragraph 21, the University provided the
Commissioner with screenshots of the process involved in providing
the requested information. The Commissioner notes that the process
of locating, retrieving and extracting the requested information is
not as straightforward as it would seem.”
These arguments are not inherently convincing. This is because
there is no evidence provided by the University to explain why the
system must be accessed using the GUI in question, rather than a more
efficient alternative user interface available to a system administrator.
Neither did the Commissioner consider if it was possible to automate
the use of the existing GUI, perhaps by macros or other mechanisms,
even though this can now be done with a broad range of freely available
software tools. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Commissioner to
use the screenshots presented by the University as decisive evidence of
how long it would take to search that particular information system.
4.1.2. Arbitrarily constrained search
The second set of cases concerns an assertion that an electronic
information system was constrained to search by certain pre-populated
keywords or categories (for example a report set up in the system), or
alternatively, that a very limited form of keyword search was available.
In other words, a limited form of electronic search was said to be
possible, but only in effect with pre-designed searches built into the
system. In turn, this was used to support a proposition that it was not
possible to conduct an effective search to fulfil the information request
within the cost limit. One example of this is in FS50621863, where a
requester asked:
“how many parking tickets have been issued by MBC to emergency
services (Police, Fire and Ambulance) vehicles in the past 2 years,
with a breakdown by service and vehicle type.”
In the case, the Council claimed that they would have to manually
read and review each file, because the council is only able to search for
specific categories. It was asserted that there was no option to search for
emergency vehicles, which the ICO accepted. However, it is entirely
unclear why the free-text information itself could not be directly sear-
ched. There were many other instances where similar arguments were
accepted, for example in FS50638359 (a request for building issues and
repairs), the Commissioner argued that:
“Because the nature of each reported issue is entered as free text,
specific types of reported issues cannot be automatically retrieved
using the current search capabilities of either database. … The
Commissioner has considered the Council's submissions and re-
cognises that the reported issues are not recorded and stored by
category (e.g. ‘leak’). This means that the information cannot be
automatically retrieved. The Commissioner therefore accepts that a
manual search for relevant information would need to be under-
taken, with judgement applied to identify the information sought by
the request.”
This conclusion appears to have been reached without sufficient
scrutiny: it would be unusual not to be able to automate the search of
Table 2
Summary of the number of cases identified as falling within each theme, together with the Sections where these aret were discussed. The last two columns of the
table, provide totals of each category, namely the number of cases where there was at least 1 GUI error (i.e. across Section 4.1) and where there was at least 1 error
generally. As can be seen, in some cases, there were multiple errors. The last row of the table expresses the proportion of cases where the error was found as a
percentage relative to the total number of cases (75) where a complaint from a requester was not upheld.
GUI-Non automatic
(Section 4.1.1)
GUI-Arbitrarily
constrained (Section
4.1.2)
GUI-Chinese wall
(Section 4.1.3)
Inappropriate keyword
search (Section 4.2)
Reading entire
documents (Section
4.3.)
Cases with at
least 1 GUI
error
Total cases
with at least 1
error
Number of Cases 7 6 8 7 8 21 30
Percentage of Sample 9.33% 8% 10.66% 9.33% 10.66% 28% 40%
4 In fairness to the University, they did suggest to the Commissioner that they
might be slightly more efficient as they moved through the task.
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free text fields. In all of the cases where this argument was raised by a
Public Authority, there was no inspection of the database system by the
Commissioner. Neither was there any explanation recorded in the
Decision Notice as to why the data returned from an initial query could
not be exported into a more easily searchable format. Without this,
there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the search would exceed
the cost limit.
4.1.3. Chinese walls
The final established instance of the ‘GUI search’ problem was the
asserted existence of ‘Chinese Walls’, wherein organisations would
regularly argue that they could not search their electronic information
systems as a whole, but would need to separately search individual
elements of them. Typically, this would manifest as a Public Authority
requiring each individual who might hold records to perform searches.
The Commissioner would usually accept this, without any exploration
or discussion, for example as in FS50624914, which concerned a re-
organisation within a Council:
“The Commissioner sees that the request made is very broad in
asking for all information held. Therefore she is satisfied with the
council's explanations given as to why every employee would have
to carry out searches in order for the council to ensure they had
gathered all the information it holds within the scope of the re-
quest.”
As a justification, this is somewhat surprising. Presumably a re-
organisation would be driven by a few people (who would then dis-
tribute that information more widely/hold discussions with key stake-
holders). It also overlooks the fact that email inboxes can usually be
combined for a search, so if an employee had no records meeting the
terms of a query, then there would no need for any human review of
any documents in their mailbox. Interestingly enough, in FS50627643,
one Public Authority argued that it was technolocally impossible to do
this (in the other cases, the ICO accepted this assumption without
question) because they were using a “legacy” IT system (i.e. prior to
Exchange 2013), which on the face of it appears to be a GUI error
(previous versions of Exchange had a command line facility). Although
it is possible that this issue actually applied to the Public Authority in
question, the ICO in effect accepted this as a bare assertion, without
properly probing this important issue.
4.2. Loose keywords
There were a number of cases where an organisation entered in
some keywords into the system, counted the number of records re-
turned and asserted that all of these documents would have to be read
by a human. These high figures, typically in the thousands, were then
used as a basis to refuse a request under s.12, after being multiplied by
an average expected time to review each record. In many cases, these
figures were generally accepted by the Commissioner without any ap-
parent questioning or further enquires. An example of this, amongst
others, is FS50621207, wherein it was stated that:
“Defra explained that it has conducted an electronic search to
identify files that contain key words in their titles that relate to the
terms of the request such as ‘prince’, ‘consent’, ‘bill’, ‘act’ and
‘statutory’. This search returned approximately 10500 files.”
The Commissioner accepted that position without further ex-
amination. A second example of this can be found in FS50627712,
wherein a similar estimate was accepted in a case concerning the
documentation stored by HM Treasury in respect of tolls in respect of
the Mersey Tunnel. The Commissioner in that case also asserted that the
search was not wide enough, observing that:
“There were five key terms used in the searches which were as
follows; Mersey Tunnel, Toll, Liverpool City Region, LCR and
Mersey Travel. … The Commissioner considers it important to note
that a search of ‘Mersey Tunnel’ plus ‘toll’ may have produced
documentation falling within the scope of the request but may not
have produced all relevant documentation within scope. For ex-
ample, it may not have produced documentation where the word
‘toll’ was not mentioned but ‘levy’ or ‘charge’ was used instead.”
The Commissioner then went on to assert that “where the scope of a
request is wide, searches will inevitably include duplication”. However, this
is also incorrect in most circumstances, because it is possible to auto-
matically remove duplicate text if all the data is in a manipulatable
electronic form using a simple function, and there was no evidence that
the text could not be manipulated in such a fashion.
There were some occasions the Commissioner addressed arguments
in respect of how the search might be modified. In the case of
FS50612076, the Commissioner questioned if the temporal period was
appropriate, as well considering the potential effect of a wider keyword
search with “broader parameters”, however did not consider how the design
of the search might be modified to reduce the amount of records that needed
to be reviewed (there was an even more fundamental problem with this
decision notice, see 4.3). With respect to the case of FS50628524, the
prospect of reducing the number of records was noted, but the com-
missioner then went on to assert that this would unlikely be to enable
the Complainant to succeed “due to the volume of records on the Airsweb
[database] system and the fact that this work would need to be duplicated
for each of the 12 Service Provider contracts.” However, this is incorrect
from the perspective of computer science, because the difficulty in re-
trieving records depends on how separable the data to be retrieved is
from the rest of it (formally, this is known as Class Separability
(Fukunaga, 1990)), rather than being directly proportional to the total
number of records in the system (or indeed, their location within an
electronic filing system). A third example, the case of FS50590699, was
where a complainant said that the list of keywords required should be
narrowed: the Commissioner simply asserted that this might not cap-
ture everything in the request and rejected it on that basis, even though
the estimate (at 21 hours) was only 3 hours over the time limit. The
concern is that these cases have not involved any deep inspection and
the Commissioner readily accepts that applying a search would mean
that all results emerging would need to be considered, rather than the
search strategy being refined over time (and the number of records
required to be inspected being reduced throughout the search).
4.3. Reading entire documents
The Information Commissioner and the Public Authority's re-
sponsible for requests regularly assert that documents arising from a
keyword search would always need to be read beginning to end in order
to determine if they are relevant to the request. However, if a requester
asks for documents that ‘contain’ the requested information (e.g. ‘please
send me all documents that make reference to X, Y or Z’), then it is
unlikely that the document would need to be read beginning to end.
Unless the request involved sophisticated analysis, the portion of the
document that needs to be considered would relate to where and how
the keyword search was triggered. Nevertheless, the Information
Commissioner has accepted without criticism a range of estimates
where someone would spend a considerable amount of time considering
each document.
One striking example is the case documented in FS50647606, where
the Department for Transport asserted that “each email we checked was
lengthy and dense with information” and then said it would take five
minutes to read each email. Following an intervention by the
Commissioner, the Department for Transport decided to perform a
sampling exercise, finding it would take them four minutes to read each
message beginning to end. However, the assertion seems unlikely, be-
cause the requester asked for “all correspondence” and thus the
Department would only need to read a sufficient volume of material to
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determine if it was relevant to the issue at hand (i.e. the “emails, memos
and other material concerning the announcement of Stanford West as
Highways England's preferred location for the Operation Stack lorry park”).
In other cases, the estimate to read a document was lower, but the
records were more obviously identifiable (that is, there could be no
argument for reading outside of the paragraph or sentence containing
the keywords). With respect to the case of FS50628524, a keyword
search aimed at identifying “incidents involving winter service vehicles”, it
was said to take a “very conservative 2 minutes per record” for the reason:
“In order to identify incidents involving winter service vehicles each
report must be opened. Each report contains 10 pages relating to the
incident. Each page needs to be opened and read to ascertain
whether the incident involves a winter service vehicle.”
Presumably a quick keyword search on the document itself would
suffice. The same point could also be made for FS50611773, wherein
the requester was requesting documents relating to Islamic State and it
would apparently take three minutes for each record to be reviewed.
There is a final, more excruciating example that should be mentioned,
wherein a requester (see FS50612076) asked for all correspondence in a
given email inbox mentioning specific keywords (i.e. “statistic(s)”,
“figure(s)”, “employment” and/or “job(s)”) across the months of
May–September 2015. The ICO accept an estimate of 30 seconds to read
a document to see if it is relevant. The problem is that in respect of such
a request, there is no need to read the document at all, because of the
deterministic (and strategic) approach adopted by the requester: he
expressly requests the results of the keyword search. So s.12 would not
apply to that case. However, it could be that the volume of information
to be released (and the consequent need for redaction) would amount to
a vexatious request which the Public Authority could reject under s.14.
5. The technological errors
Taking each of the themes articulated above, this work now turns to
consider how each of the foregoing concerns identified in Section 4
amount to likely technological errors on the part of the Commissioner.
The headings in this section mirror those in the previous one for that
reason.
5.1. Graphical user interface limits or prohibits electronic search
There appears to be a widespread lack of recognition by both Public
Authorities and the Commissioner that most information systems can be
searched in a variety of different fashions, including those which go
beyond the constraints of a specific GUI widely used by front line staff
performing routine administrative processes. However, most data can
be manipulated into a common searchable format. If it is translated or
manipulated within this format, then with command line access is that
any reasonable function can be applied to the data, which means au-
tomatically searching in an unrestricted manner. Furthermore, dupli-
cates can be automatically identified in retrieved results (because they
will be substrings of one another and one can simply iterate over all the
documents returned using a pair-wise comparison to identify – and thus
eliminate – repeated results), thus limiting the amount of records that
need to be directly inspected and removing the ‘Chinese wall’ between
different user accounts and document sources raised in Section 4.1.3.
In reality, the great majority of modern systems are based on a
standardised database that underpins the system and which any rea-
sonable operation can be applied to search it (typically through a
‘command line’). With the advent of open-source libraries such as
Apache Tika which can automatically parse thousands of different file-
formats, this also applies to unstructured filing systems. Yet with all the
cases considered under Section 4.1, the Commissioner assumes without
further investigation that the electronic system cannot be searched ef-
ficiently (or at all), usually based on some facet of a GUI that they are
pointed to, without having documented in their Decision Notice any
exploration of alternative approaches towards information searching
and int turn whether they could be used in a given case.
This represents a misunderstanding. There are multiple routes to-
wards accessing an existing information system, yet the Commissioner
operates on the presumption that search can only be performed using
the specialised interfaces used by front-line administrators for specific
tasks. The problem is that this interface normally abstracts away the
underlying database (although in some cases, it could simply be the
case that the Public Authority in question is not aware of how to use the
existing interface), thereby overlooking the more powerful command
line tools which would enable a more rapid means for conducting the
more general searches required in response to a FOIA (2000) request:
after all, these requests are often “niche” in what they ask for (Worthy,
Amos, & Bourke, 2011). In effect, the Public Authority is not using any
Fig. 1. Database Access Flows. This figure depicts the distinct ways that a database can be manipulated in practice. Route A represents is the standard GUI (Graphical
User Interface) used to access the Database in normal usage. This GUI is often constrained to a limited range of pre-programmed functions or reports in a deployed
system. However, as long as someone has the credentials (or ‘root’ access), then it is possible to apply any command or function to the data, meaning that the search
would be unconstrained, via Route C. In some cases, this can be done on a copy of the data within the database, for instance on an existing ‘backup’ of the live data,
per Route D. Even if someone does not have the appropriate access credentials, then Route B demonstrates that a GUI bot (or macro) can normally be used to extract
the relevant information into a standard searchable format (which can then be protected with new credentials), without a human manually performing a repeated set
of commands for each record using a keyboard and mouse.
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administrator access to search the database, even though that is nor-
mally available, for instance to backup or restore data as necessary.
Even if the Public Authority were not to have direct administrator (e.g.
the underlying database was locked down in such a way that they could
not use it), then it is possible to easily use a ‘macro’ based program that
automatically perform a repeated command in respect of the system in
question (and thus extract the data stored in a searchable format), ex-
amples of such tools include Perfect Automation, Kantu and SikuliX.
Accordingly, there are a broad range of different routes by which a
Public Authority can search more efficiently than using a typical GUI:
these are illustrated in Fig. 1. Yet in none of the cases enumerated in
Section 4.1, did the Commissioner provide evidence of asking a Public
Authority why they did not have administrator access to enable them to
search more quickly, or why they could not use a GUI automation tool:
indeed, the Commissioner often did not even determine the precise
format the data is held. These unasked questions are in effect techno-
logical errors made by the Commissioner in their analysis. Given the
widespread use of a ‘GUI’ defence of one kind or another (and its reg-
ular success before the Information Commissioner), the presumption of
‘non-searchability’ is a serious barrier that will increasingly obstruct
legitimate FOIA requesters from accessing the information to which
they are entitled.
5.2. Loose keywords
The Human Computer Interaction literature recognises that search
is an iterative process, where queries are modified in order to enable
people to narrow down the location of information (Aula, Khan, &
Guan, 2010; Teevan, Alvarado, Ackerman, & Karger, 2004). Most im-
portantly, asides in the simplest of cases (where the information is easy
to find), there is a process of inspecting the records that emerge and
modifying the search strategy (and thus the number of records that
need to be considered in a manual review). Objectively, such a process
is inevitable: a simple keyword search might not detect obvious ways of
reducing the amount of data to be reviewed. For instance, the key
correspondence might be contained in a single email exchange (which
can be easy to locate and produces duplicates5), the filter may well be
being triggered by an email signature that happens to contain one or
more the keywords in question, or perhaps that a project is based on a
given keyword or codename (which could then be used as a replace-
ment search query that replaces the number of records to be reviewed).
Under such circumstances, it is possible that adjusting the search could
reduce the number of records by an order of magnitude.: It should also
be bourne in mind that the number of records to be reviewed is one
factor in a formula, where the other element might also be reduced,
namely how long it takes to consider each record to determine if it is
relevant.
This means that an initial consideration of the number of records
returned from an unrefined keyword search will almost certainly be a
serious overestimate of how many records will need to be reviewed. In
practice, it is simply a way of saying that it will take a ‘long time but we
are not sure how long’: there is no direct linkage between the number of
records raised by an initial query and how long it will take to search an
information system (those figures are not directly proportional to one
another). It can be properly said that such a calculation is not an esti-
mate, but a ‘guess’, and a guess is not a permissible basis to refuse re-
liance on s.12. Accordingly, the reliance on unrefined keyword searches
without properly inspecting the data is not a proper basis for rejecting a
claim under s.12 of the FOIA. The various considerations of how the
initial keyword search often raised within the Commissioner's decisions
(see Section 4.2) might be modified is simply a distraction from that
issue, likewise with the other technnological issues raised: the failure to
recognise the iterative nature of information search still remains.
5.3. Reading entire documents
This is the presumption that a document must be read beginning to
end, rather than selectively around locations identified by keyword
searches. More specifically, it is assumed that rather than a region
surrounding a keyword being relevant (and only that aspect), the entire
document must be read beginning to end regardless. As Fig. 2 illus-
trates, if allowed, this approach would vastly increase the amount of
time to determine the relevance of documents in the context of s.12.
In some respects, the approach of reading entire documents would
accord with intuition: there is a degree of connectivity between dif-
ferent pages in the same document. However, the extent to which there
is connectivity depends on the nature of the document itself and the
reason why the keyword filter was triggered. If the triggering of the
keyword filter at a given point made it clear that a document was to be
included, then there would be no need to read it any further. Similarly,
the triggering of the keyword filter at a given point might also indicate
that there is a false positive insofar as the keyword search is concerned,
and thus the document need not be read in detail (presuming the
keyword filter is not triggered elsewhere therein). As such, a modelling
assumption that each and every document must be read in totality is
bound to be an overestimate in nearly all cases: indeed, existing re-
search demonstrates that humans attempting to read entire documents
increases the risk of error, due to the ‘F-shaped’ pattern of reading that
is often adopted (Nielsen, 2006). Moreover, the more focussed the
original keyword search, the less material would need to be read within
each document (because the keyword filter would on average be trig-
gered less often within each result returned), meaning that this error is
magnified if combined with a poorly designed keyword search.
6. Discussion
This article now turns to consider the implications of the techno-
logical concerns identified above and makes policy recommendations,
both concerning the cost limit and beyond that. From a technological
perspective, there are two concerns: the apparent lack of expertise
amongst those evaluating the estimates in question and the fact that the
calculations for keyword searches (when they were conducted) amount
to an inappropriate use of mathematics. Fortunately, both concerns are
remediable with changes in practice. There is also a wider issue, namely
that many Public Authorities seem not to understand the operations of
their own information systems, which has wider implications for in-
formation management practice, including with respect to data pro-
tection concerns. This discussion concludes with a summary of the
limitations of this work and in turn, the opportunities for future in-
vestigation.
6.1. Require estimates to be backed with technological expertise
The widespread existence of the ‘GUI’ problem suggests a significant
lack of technological expertise on the part of those staff members in the
Information Commissioner who adjudicated upon FOIA (2000) com-
plaints. This appears to be mirrored in the Public Authorities who ori-
ginally handle these requests. The result is that many cases, at least
insofar as they are being appealed to the Information Commissioner,
are being wrongly decided on the basis of a bare assertion that the
Public Authorities systems cannot be searched automatically (or are
restricted in some way), even when this is unlikely to be correct. This
suggests that a higher standard of proof is required, for instance only
accepting a written submission of a suitably regulated IT professional in
support of the ‘GUI’ defence being advanced on behalf of a Public
Authority. This would protect against a Public Authority improperly
5 This issue has been found to be easily addressable with modern search tools
by the National Archives in their recent investigation: http://www.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/technology-assisted-review-to-born-
digital-records-transfer.pdf.
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refusing a request on such grounds going forwards. By the same token,
it appears that the Information Commissioner would be better as a
matter of course to use suitably qualified experts (i.e. experienced
Computer Scientists) to adjudicate upon these cases, because they
would be able to more rapidly and effectively consider (on behalf of a
requester, who is unlikely to have these skills) the validity of a given
estimate.
It might be appropriate to go further and simply prohibit – barring
exceptional circumstances – a Public Authority to perform computations
on the basis of a particular GUI. In effect, this would be a clear pre-
sumption that a system can be manipulated by the command line using
direct database operations in order to conduct a search. There are
powerful arguments in support of this position. Suppose a Public
Authority could rely on the features of a given GUI as part of its defence
under a cost limit. Then, if this were to be accepted going forwards
(particularly noting that the Europen Court of Human Right in Magyar
Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary (Application no. 18030/11) barred in-
competence as a defence for information falling within the scope of that
decision), then Information Systems designers might deliberately design
systems that cannot be efficiently used within their GUI to make general
enquiries. This would be inappropriate as a matter of public policy, as
allowing for such a possibility would undermine the FOIA (2000) and
any related regimes. Indeed, this would be a far more serious and deli-
terious version of the events in Canada, where information systems were
developed in order to minimise the effect of Public Authorities own
Access to Information responsibilities (Roberts, 2005). Yet in effect, this
is what many Public Authorities are claiming to have done with how they
organise and manipulate information in FOIA (2000) cases: they say that
they have purchased systems where it is apparently difficult (at the least,
for them) to effectively retrieve information in response to custom
queries. It is a practice which is concerning on a fundamental level in
respect of public accountability. This concern is only likely to become
more problematic going forwards, particularly with the reality that
Public Authorities are holding increasingly large volumes of information,
but have no clear plans to use more sophisticated approaches towards
accessing the information that they hold.
6.2. Recalculating time
The application of technological expertise would address the pro-
blem of ‘GUI’ errors and the presumption of reading documents be-
ginning to end. However, it remains to address the approach towards
estimating the number of records to be read in an electronic informa-
tion system. The Commissioner's approach towards calculating search
time using the number of results returned by an initial keyword search
might be justifiable if it were somehow to be a ‘least worst’ option. This
requires the construction of a replacement. Fortunately, there is a more
Fig. 2. Document Reading Times. This diagram illustrates the effect of not exploiting keyword search results when reading documents. The (dark) shaded areas
indicate the text that has to be read under a given approach. On the left (A), is where keywords are not exploited and it is presumed that the entire document must be
read. On the right, there are two cases (B & C) where keywords are explored, where there were two keyword ‘hits’, within the document. In case B, the information
surrounding the first ‘hit’ is enough to deem the document relevant, and the document need not be read further. In respect of case C, the first hit is not sufficient to
conclude the document is relevant, and thus the text surrounding the second ‘hit’ of the keyword search must be read. In cases B and C, far less material has to be
considered than in case A, meaning that the use of keywords can be highly efficient.
Fig. 3. An illustration of the search process, for the purpose of illustrating the
concept of Precision and Recall. At the top are the records to be filtered, whilst
those returned (for manual review) are at the bottom of the page. The Precision
is the proportion of those returned by the search which are relevant: in this
case, 3/5 of those are relevant, or a Precision of 60% or 0.6 as a decimal. The
Recall is the proportion of the relevant records which were in fact returned: in
this example there are 7 relevant records, of which 3 were identified, meaning a
Recall of 42.9% (3/7) or 0.429 as a decimal.
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effective way of estimating whether a search strategy is appropriate,
which ultimately results in a reformulation of the cost limit as an es-
timated number of documents to be retrieved, the question then be-
comes as simple as: how many documents the requester is the asking for?
When this figure is multiplied through by the average time to find and
extract one relevant document, this formulation means that the time
taken to locate (and extract) documents will be directly proportional to
the volume of information requested.
How do we get to the average time to find and extract one relevant
document? This approach involves a sampling exercise of a different
flavour to what is normally performed by the ICO. First, the concepts of
Precision and Recall are widely accepted within the legal system as
being appropriate measures for a given search strategy (see Section
2.2). The Precision is the proportion of the total records retrieved from a
search that are relevant, whilst the Recall is the proportion of relevant
records that were in fact returned: a concrete example of these statistics
can be found in Fig. 3. Any search can be designed in order to balance
between the two concepts: a wide search would have a high Recall, but
a low Precision, and vice versa: what matters is what happens when
there is a reasonable balance between the two. The lower the Precision,
the longer a search will take, as more irrelevant records will have to be
reviewed. However, a fair search can only be so inefficient, and thus
implies a minimum Precision. With legal retrieval systems having a
figure of approaching 90%, one would be surprised if a Precision in
reality (for a competent search) would be below 50%, and 25% would
be a figure that might be used in an upper bound on search time (al-
though the Public Authorities task is to demonstrate that the cost limit
would be exceeded, so they would need a lower bound and thus a re-
latively high Precision).
In practice, these means a modification of the Commissioner's cal-
culations, involving the following formula as an estimate, where
Nrelevant is the total number of records to be retrieved, Tconsider is the
average time to consider one record:
×N T
Precision
relevant consider
The Precision would be pre-determined, whilst the time to read one
record can be estimated by sampling using the existing approach to
determine how long it would take to read a record (i.e. where the Public
Authority simply takes a random subset and calculates the average time
to consider it within the meaning of s.12). However, one can determine
the number of relevant results (or at least have a concrete estimate) by
performing a sampling exercise. This simply involves taking a random
sample (subset) of the records that the Public Authority asserts that it
needs to search, and calculating the proportion of those records that are
actually relevant, before scaling it to apply to the entire dataset (the
size of the sample would depend on the scarcity of the records in
question and the desired degree of accuracy). For example, if 100 re-
cords were examined, and four were returned as being true, and the
Precision was 50%, then the organisations estimate were be reduced by
a factor of 12.5 (because only 8 out of a sample of 100 would be read in
a refined search).6 See Fig. 4 for an illustration of this process and a
worked example.
These calculations have an interesting consequence: they are not
actually based upon direct estimates of search time, but are propor-
tional to the volume of data that the requester wishes to retrieve. This
suggests that time limits for finding documents are unnecessary and
inappropriate as a measure of burden. In other words, these calcula-
tions actually suggest the policy basis for s.12 is unnecessary: if
someone asks for a reasonable volume of information (rather than a
vast tranche of documents), then s.12 need not impede them. Policy
designers should reconsider including ‘estimates’ of search time as a
means for measuring whether a request should be fulfilled, or equally as
a mechanism for charging requesters for the provision of Information.
Furthermore, given the extensive length of time involved in redacting
documents, the amount of time to find them in an electronic system is
likely to be heavily outweighed by that consideration, meaning that
volume of information would be a better means of calculating the
general burden of fulfilling a request in respect of an electronic in-
formation system (although as this approach would not apply for a
manual filing system, a cost estimate might remain fair for these in-
creasingly rare cases).
6.3. Appropriate records management in Public Authorities
There is a further concern. On the face of it, many Public Authorities
seem not to understand the degree of accessibility of the information
within their systems, mistakenly believing that information search is
confined to a given GUI. Accessibility correlates to security and in turn
appropriate data protection management. At the least, the people re-
sponsible for information management in a broad range of Public
Authorities seem not to understand the speed or efficiency as to which
their own information systems can actually be operated, if an operator
has the necessary expertise to do so. It appears that some Public
Authorities have not moved on from the chaotic accounts of informa-
tion searching that arose soon after the FOIA (2000) was introduced
(Shepherd et al., 2010).
With an increased emphasis upon consent to be expected under Data
Protection Law (especially with the introduction of the General Data
Protection Regulation in the European Union), it is notable that a Public
Authority cannot have effective consent in many circumstances if it is
based upon a wrong understanding of how the stored data can be
manipulated and accessed. For example, someone might only consent to
their personal data being accessed by a given person within an orga-
nisation, when the reality might be somewhat different. The same point
would apply to data that is highly sensitive and arguably ought not be
stored in such an information system in the first place. Accordingly, the
concerns arising from this investigation of s.12 implies inappropriate
information management practice.
This means that the deployment of technological expertise by the
Commissioner would be particularly valuable: not only does the re-
quester get a fair hearing of their FOIA (2000) complaint, but serious
errors in data protection practice can be identified and addressed before
they cause harm to large numbers of data subjects. The very purpose
and advantage of having an Information Commissioner as opposed a
generalist Ombudsman is so that the organisations front-line staff are
experts in that field (Holsen & Pasquier, 2015; Mendel & Unesco, 2008).
But perceived expertise might be a double edged sword: the Commis-
sioners current practice might be seen as tacit endorsement of in-
appropriate information management practice by Public Authorities,
because it is being upheld in formal decisions issued by them (even if
this is by a different team within the same organisation). Arguably then,
it is inappropriate for Data Protection and Access to Information in-
vestigations to be seen as separate entities, insofar as both concern the
mechanics of information management within a Public Authority (this
applies to s.12, but also sometimes s.14 of the FOIA (2000)). Where a
regulator has a dual responsibility, there is a need for both aspects to be
considered together, rather than being treated as atomically separate
matters, not only because it is more likely to lead to the right result, but
because of the risk that a Commissioner's Access to Information op-
erations end up undermining their Data Protection activities.
6.4. Limitations
This article has provided an exploration of the role of estimation in
6 This does not address the scenario where the sample returns very few true
results, because the estimate could be inaccurate. In that case, a larger sample
might have to be used. Furthermore, it would be beneficial if confidence in-
tervals were returned, especially in edge cases. The Commissioner or the
Tribunal could then direct a further sampling exercise if needed.
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Access to Information regimes. There are three ways this work could be
expanded upon. First, it is not possible to determine what would have
happened if the Information Commissioner had conducted a more
technologically informed investigation. It is possible that further
questioning might have produced an estimate that could be relied upon
under s.12: all this work shows is that the calculations provided to the
Commissioner were wrong or inappropriate. The most obvious way this
could arise is if the Commissioner rejected the reliance on a defence
based upon Graphical User Interface limitations and then the Public
Authority presented a new (and correct) estimate that showed the cost
limit would be exceeded even without these concerns. Similarly, the
fact that a case might not be of substance under s.12 does not mean that
a Public Authority could not rely upon another section, especially s.14
(if there would be a high burden of redaction). Second, this analysis
only concerns the Information Commissioner of one jurisdiction.
Although the difficulties identified in this article span many Public
Authorities with a broad range of information systems, further work
might seek to reproduce the results of this research in an international
setting. However, given that this would require addressing the different
legal tests and scenarios across a range of jurisdictions (and which
would require a different legal test to applied to the qualitative analysis
in respect of each jurisdiction), such an extended analysis was not
feasible in an article of this length. Finally, it is possible – given the
conservative approach adopted – that there are missing categories of
errors not identified in this work. Accordingly, there are important
opportunities to expand upon the findings made in this article.
7. Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that mathematical and technological
errors likely underpin many of the UK Information Commissioner's
decisions on search times under s.12 of the Freedom of Information Act
(2000). Estimates have often been conflated with mere guesses, with
the information being provided by a Public Authority failing to de-
monstrate the unlikely difficulties that were regularly raised. These
findings might extend naturally to a broad range of other Freedom of
Information systems: for instance, both Canada and the USA provide for
a requester to be required to pay for search time, which in turn could be
grossly inflated by an incompetent officer of a Public Authority using an
inappropriate search strategy. As such, the findings and arguments
provided in this article can be directly applied when considering the
design of Access to Information systems, as well as in the advocacy of
cases that relate to these issues.
Most importantly, this article has demonstrated that a different
approach towards Access to Information policy is required, with a more
robust test of any estimates that assert technological concerns, and a
need to move away from a priori estimates of search time as a me-
chanism of determining if documentation should be provided. Instead,
presuming an appropriate calculation process, these estimates can be
replaced with fairer calculations based upon the volume of information
being requested. This is particularly of concern in the near future:
Public Authority information systems are due to become more ex-
pansive and with that, more dynamic, especially with the increased
emphasis on a ‘big data’ agenda. There is a pressing need to ensure that
Access to Information Legislation does not lag behind these technolo-
gical changes. It is hoped that this work will help enable a more just
approach towards managing the potential resource burdens of Access to
Information requests going forwards.
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